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Abstract. In 20th century's European theory of education there was little interest in philosophy 
of democracy. John Dewey's Democracy and Education was translated in nearly every European 
language but did not become the center of discussion. Even "radical education" was much more child- 
centered than open to radical questions ofpolitical democracy. This article discusses the problem in 
two respects, first the tension between neo-liberalism's concept of individuality and public education, 
and second the future problems of a theory of "democratic education" after Dewey. The aim is to 
overcome traditional European dualisms like that of "citizen" or "man" i.e. to pave the way for a 
post-Rousseauian theory of education. 
In February 1915, John Dewey held three public lectures at the invitation of the 
John Calvin McNair Foundation at the University of Chapel Hill. These lectures 
were published a few months later under the title of German Philosophy and 
Politics. In the context of the war propaganda by German philosophers from Natorp 
to Scheler, 1Dewey attacked the "a priori philosophy" based on the doctrine of 
"innate ideas". This doctrine had already worried Locke, and not only, according 
to Dewey, in his critique of platonic philosophy but also on the basis of a political 
suspicion. The aspect hat must have worried liberal philosophy "was the readiness 
with which such ideas become strongholds behind which authority shelters itself 
from questioning" (Dewey, 1985, pp. 159-160). Thus critical philosophy would 
not have been really critical and its rigid system of ethical duty accompanied by the 
ideal of inward integrity (op. cit., p. 163) had made it authoritarian and believing 
in the state, as Dewey tried to demonstrate principally in connection with Fichte. 2 
(op. cit., pp. 172 et seq.) He marked the beginning of the transformation of critical 
into authoritarian and nationalistic philosophy (op. c/t., p. 172) which prevented 
any democratic concept of German philosophy from ever coming into being. 
Fichte's speeches, according to Dewey, justified authoritarian state education 
and draped it in a national humanism which turned the meaning and opportunity of 
modem education on its head. It was said in this way: 
Education is the means of the advancement of humanity towards the realisation 
of its divine perfection. Education is the work of the State ... But in order that 
the State may carry on its educational or moral mission, it must not only possess 
* Inaugural lecture upon taking office at the University of Zurich on 22nd November 1999. 
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organisation and commensurate power but it must also control the conditions 
which secure the possibility offered to the individuals composing it. (op. cir., 
p. 174) 
The result, according to Dewey, is State Socialism (op. cit., p. 175) which 
controls property and education in equal measure. The prerequisite for this is 
authority and the appropriate philosophy, which regards education as "inward" 
and thus removes the state from control by its citizens. Indeed, nationalisation was 
the basic process of the development of the European schools system in the 19th 
century, and the Prussian school organisation was the finest example of educa- 
tional efficiency; thus a socialisation of education developed which still to this 
day determines the supply of education. Democracy is not relevant, or to be more 
precise is only marginally relevant, and it is no accident that it was formulated in 
the crisis years of the century: 1848, 1871, and just before the First World War. 
This could account for the official writing of history. It forgets all about 
anarchists, pacifists, the women's rights movement, the avant-garde ofeducational 
life-reform, experimental school republics, non-German conditions, and a great 
deal else as well. Little attempt ismade to examine the educational concepts and the 
practical efforts of these groups or cultures, 3 and historical education researchers 
are only just beginning to take an interest in these experiments which contradict 
the theory that democracy, in its broadest sense, has never been the subject of 
any educational theory that has been determined completely, at least in Germany, 
by Fichte's speeches. On the other hand, the reality of the discussion is such 
that the "Speeches to the German nation" from 1808 onward have always been 
a reference-point i  political educational science in Germany, quite regardless of 
the caesurae in society and the constitution. They were attractive to the discussion 
of education for three reasons: they made a radical distinction between "old" and 
"new" education, they defined a national educational mission, and by referring 
back to Pestalozzi's theories and the concept of institutionalised ucation they 
represented a realistic opportunity for this mission. National Renaissance seemed 
to be feasible with the education of one single new generation, provided it was 
universally available and the state would provide the necessary compulsion. 4 
I am interested not so much by a "special German route" but by the pattern of 
this argumentation: the educational mission has taken control of the international 
reform of education i  the 20th century, which wanted to achieve the education of 
"new people", was infected with enthusiasm for the emancipation "of the child", 
and hoped thereby to renew society completely. On the other hand, "democracy" 
was banished to the margins of discussion, and this is true even if one grants more 
weight o outsiders like Alexander Neill or Jean Piaget han is usual in most of the 
historiography on this first half of the "century of the child". The "new education" 
was still mainly concerned with the inward definition of the child or else with 
state socialism in one form or another. In Europe, at least, reform in education has 
never felt itself to be under any obligation to democracy, although this does not 
mean that democratic societies uch as that of Switzerland were able to develop 
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an educational system that could be regarded as republican. What, however, is 
meant or not meant exactly by "combining democracy and education"? This is 
a surprisingly vague and somewhat neglected theoretical problem which has taken 
on a new impetus in recent years, and it is no accident that this impetus has come 
mainly from Britain and America. 
In this lecture, I will be making an attempt, based on Dewey, to go into more 
detail on this problem and to show why it will become an urgent one in the future. 
Of course, what I have to offer you today is the only a sketch or a blank, and 
not a programme that is finished in every detail, as this would already have had 
to solve too many theoretical problems or at least to have started to deal with 
them effectively before it could dare to venture out in public. My sketch starts 
with Dewey's essay, "Democracy and Education", published in 1916, one year 
after the criticism of the German philosophy and bearing the heavy stamp of this 
criticism (1). In a second step, I will deal with the theorems of liberalism which 
have resulted in the present-day tension in the relationship between democracy 
and education (2). Finally, I would like to express my views on the future of 
the problem, meaning the prospects for the development of general education i  
a democratic society (3). My dissertation will go far beyond that which Dewey 
defined in 1916 as the cornerstones of the problem, and I will also attempt to 
demonstrate that "democracy" cannot be defined merely as a form of life and that 
education cannot simply be its correlation. Democracy is the politically controlled 
process of change and a socially participative exchange, which means that it repre- 
sents mobility of communication a d form for which there is not simply school 
equipment available. On the other hand, the relationship between democracy and 
education cannot be defined just as a simple and endless learning process either; it 
requires emphasis in its contents, and this cannot be justified any longer in terms 
of ethical philosophy. The problem is that democracy has something to do with 
public actions and must therefore xclude authoritarian morals, although on the 
other hand it is dependent on virtues and requires loyalty. 
1. Democracy and Education 
At the end of his argumentative essay in 1915, Dewey expressed his view of the 
European category of "Americanism", which everybody in those days would have 
understood tobe an aggressive and pejorative term used to set a cultural distance 
between the "old world" and the "new world". This makes a rink, long before 
Spengler's day, between "culture" and "civirisation", and creates the demarcation 
between the external and thus superficial aspects of American life and the inward 
and thus genuine aspects of German education. For those responsible for European 
education, Dewey said, "Americanism" was concomitant with "crude empiricism" 
and "material utilitarianism", and totally lacked transcendental philosophy and thus 
also idealism. Dewey went on to assert hat anything that could be called American 
philosophy and could be distinguished from continental [European] philosophy 
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was concomitant with a theory of learning which had to be regarded at the same 
time as a theory of life. Learning is "experimenting" onthe basis of "trial and 
error". Following the teaching of Darwin, life is learning, and thus means learning 
to adapt intelligently. Democracy reacts to this exactly: 
Our social organisation commits us to this philosophy of life. Our working 
principle is to try: to find out by trying, and to measure the worth of the ideas 
and theories tried by the success with which they meet he test of their appli- 
cation in practice. Concrete consequences rather than a priori rules supply our 
guiding principles. (op. cit., p. 200) 
Passages like this have earned Dewey the negative label of "instrumentalist", 
and this lasted for a particularly ong time in German education philosophy, which 
looked in vain here for the secure basis of values and did not want o dispense with 
the absolute. This is why the approaches of Plato, Hegel, and even Kant dominate 
the discussion, whilst "pragmatism" is tarred with the same brush as instrumen- 
talism and rejected for educational purposes. Admittedly, Dewey regarded the 
learning process of science as a prerequisite, which has been mainly characterised 
at least since Giordano Bruno's day 5 by intellectual curiosity, to borrow Hans 
Blumenberg's phrase. It must avoid respect to every absolute value if it is to be 
successful. A successful experiment can contradict all previous assumptions, but 
at the price of itself being contradicted by a later experiments. References to this 
learning theory can be found in the 18th-century English liberal education (Rhyn, 
1997) and for instance in Joseph Priestley (1993, pp. 39 et seq.), where, on the 
basis of Locke, civil liberty and a liberal education were meant o be connected, 
provided that an experimental learning process was available; it is no accident that 
this was exemplified by the example of the practical arts (op. cit., pp. 42 et seq.). 
They release individuality and thus avoid uniformity, because the application of 
rules always has something to do with one's own practical experience, but without 
allowing one single method to be applied exclusively. 
This criticism of the ideal of a uniform method precedes many of Dewey's 
views, but it was not possible to put them into practice, because in the 19th century 
there was a ceaseless earch for the one true method in education and teaching. 
Priestley, admittedly, realised as long ago as 1771 that: 
One method of education ... would only produce one kind of men; but the 
great excellence of human ature consists in the varieties of which it is capable. 
Instead, then, or endeavouring, by uniform and fixed systems of education, to 
keep mankind always the same, let us give free scope to everything which may 
bid fair for introducing more variety among us. (op. cit., p. 45) 
This evolutionistic view of education and teaching was not able to gain ground 
in the 19th century. Priestley, an eminent scientist and researcher of European rank, 
who was responsible for one of the first lay curricula in England, 6 was condemned 
to complete and instructive oblivion, in that it made the selection filters of educa- 
tional historiography perceptible. The factors that determined the discussion of 
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education in the 19th century and thus the basic processes for nationalising the 
educational system are theories, and with these theories the authors who placed 
human education at the focal point rather than the civil society or even experi- 
mental learning, the opportunities and risks of which were either not perceived or 
were deliberately ignored. 
Accordingly, Dewey begins Democracy and Education with a radical criticism 
of the educational theories of the 19th century and of educational reflection in 
general. He describes it as being dominated not only by the authoritarian philos- 
ophy of people like Fichte and Hegel (Dewey, 1985a, p. 102), but also as missing 
its target because it misunderstood the object or subject of education. Education, 
he claimed, had something to do with development and growth, and must herefore 
require plasticity and learning but without being able to give either of these one 
single direction that would definitively fix the limits of education (op. cit., p. 49). 
Ultimately, the child learns to learn (op. cit., p. 50), to use Dewey's famous phrase 
which turns up here for the first time. 7 
"Learning to learn" calls for controlled and intelligent processes in adapting 
to changing situations and not for a movement that has a fixed goal and remains 
unaffected by learning (op. cit., p. 55). 
However this is exactly the distinguishing feature of educational theories which 
aim: 
- to equip children in the way described in standard schoolmaster literature with 
a predefined package (preparation) 
- like Froebel or Rousseau, see education as the organic unfolding of innate 
potential 
- like Locke, regard education as writing on the blank sheet of paper of the mind 
(training) or, 
- like Herbart, use psychology for "educational teaching" (forming). 
Dewey rejected all these aims, and for convincing reasons. Modem education 
dispenses with the "package" because on the one hand the uses to which it might 
be put cannot be foreseen and on the other hand the development of universal 
schooling abolished the closed and narrow dimensions of elementary education. In 
this respect, education is not "preparation", but then it is not "organic unfolding" 
either, because this Romantic-Age idea cannot understand continuous growth but 
only the unfolding of latent forces until a predefined goal is reached (op. cit., p. 61), 
and this means that it misses exactly the point that was central for Dewey: learning, 
a process that must always take account of consequences sothat the child and later 
adult can correct itself. The romantic oncept of "development" fulfils Nature's 
plan, which accordingly has to be kept free of learning. At the same time, Dewey 
rejects the idea of the blank sheet ofpaper which had formed the basis for the force 
of educational theory in the 18th century. Children are never passive, and they learn 
in their own way without any method being able to have developed on the basis, 
as Herbart believed, of the "physics of the spirit" to circumvent this independent- 
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mindedness orbeing able to use the activity purely for the purposes of education, 
or as it was later and even more narrowly defined the "educational teaching" of 
the school. John Stuart Mill, an authority whom Dewey respected, had pointed out 
in his logical teachings in 1843 that education has to be designed in terms of its 
feedback, meaning of that which the pupils give back. It is only in the illusions 
of teachers and educators that children are passive or resemble ablackboard upon 
which absolutely anything can be written. 
In his concept of learning, Dewey was basically following William James, who 
in his Principles of Psychology had overturned three theories that had been prin- 
cipally responsible for the definition of "education": the theory of the automaton 
(because learning is not a mechanical process), the mind-stuff theory (because the 
mind is not merely filled with material), and the theory of the psyche (because there 
is no "internal space" which can store the values or desires of education (James, 
1983, pp. 148-182). Those teaching theories of the 19th century, as Dewey found 
it, were basically psychological theory which could be interpreted, as one chose, 
as being organic (as in Froebel), mechanical (as in Pestalozzi), or formative (as in 
the followers of Herbart). In addition to Puritanical sources, Froebel, Pestalozzi, 
and Herbart were the main sources of American educational theory at the end 
of the 19th century, and they were abandoned completely. What alternative did 
Dewey have? Although the 19th-century approaches were all very different from 
one another, they had one failing in common: they did not include any concept 
of democracy. The political side of "human education" was either the human 
community that the Romantic Age had envisaged, or the hierarchical society, the 
ideal state, and to a certain extent the Republic of Virtues, and not any modem form 
of democracy which defines the relationships between the public, participation, 
and education. This was exactly what Dewey was attempting todo, with a number 
of comprehensive d finitions that were intended to cover the concept of democracy 
independently of any kind of authoritarian philosophy or teaching theory. 
Democracy fundamentally rejects any principle of external authority, and relies 
on the free, deliberate decisions for which public education is a prerequisite. In 
Dewey's view, democracy is more than a form of government - it is a form of 
life, "a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated xperience" (Dewey, 
1985a, p. 93), which has to fulfil two criteria 8in order to be of any value, namely 
the participation of citizens in the common good and the free exchange of views 
between the groups within a society. The famous definition of democracy is thus 
worded: 
A society which makes provision for participation for the good of all its 
members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institu- 
tions through the interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so far 
democratic. (op. cir., p. 105) 
This definition is linked with education, but without he connotations ofthe corre- 
sponding German word Bildung. For Dewey, in fact, the term also relates to 
personal interests in social relationships and "habits of mind" attuned to change 
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but not provoking social unrest. 9However, the general run of criticism levelled at 
Dewey by everyone from Maynard Hutchins (1936) to Jacques Maritain (1943) is 
that education ismore than, and is different from, provocative l arning and coping 
with change in conditions of democratic exchanges of opinion. 1~ 
This brings me to my second point, which relates to the limits of Dewey's 
concept, and this, curiously enough, can be linked with the problems of liberalism. 
2. P rob lems of  L ibera l i sm 
The idea of defining democracy as a form of life, and thus regarding the form of 
government as secondary or even superfluous, is present at a number of points in 
19th-century British and American political discussion and in writers from Walt 
Whitman to Edward Carpenter. One particular influence on Dewey was his reading 
of Emerson (Garrison, 1998), who described the ideal of domestic life in his essay 
Society and Solitude (Works, 1912, pp. 101-129). The home and its immediate 
surroundings are the educational forces (op. cit., p. 104), and "public events" can 
be brought into connection with it (op. cit., p. 105) without really determining the 
child's personal life history (op. cit.). Institutions uch as the political Senate or 
the Courts of Justice and Chambers of Commerce lie outside that which Emerson 
calls the "way of life" (op. cit.). They force individuals to imagine and evaluate 
things which lie outside their own sphere of experience. Accordingly, the rule has 
to be: "The great facts are the near ones" (op. cit., p. 106, emphasis added by the 
present author). The main factors in "education" are thus the home and the neigh- 
bourhood, the social experience of the community, and the shared environment 
(op. cit., pp. 106-107). School is one of the focal points of the community (op. cit., 
p. 116), but it is not "cosmopolitan" in orientation; it represents he locality (op. 
cit., pp. 120--121). 11
The concentration f the educational theory on the direct community and the 
differentiation between ear and far, and between inward and outward, is one 
of the fundamentals of the history of educational theory (Oelkers, 1993). This 
fundamental notion seems to be closely connected with the object of the child, 
because children can only come to terms with that which is near to them and 
affects them directly. It is therefore no accident that the locality concepts of ideal 
education relate to gardens, villages, communities, and neighbourhoods, meaning 
dimensions which are small enough to understand and which Rousseau, Pestalozzi, 
and Froebel always regarded as paradise in miniature: enclosed, guaranteed, and 
happy. In this respect, Emerson and Dewey take over existing expectations and 
consider that, ultimately, it is the immediate environment that educates, and it can 
do so all the better if it is directly accessible. Dewey's formal criteria for democracy 
- "participation" and "flexible adaptation" - do not necessarily relate to actions in 
the immediate environment, but the basic conception of school education in which 
schools represent the "embryonic society", 12 the miniature society synecdochially 
representing adult society, is exactly obligated to the theoretical fundamentals of 
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history. The University Elementary School managed by John and Alice Dewey in 
Chicago was very much in line with the Community ideal, even if in many ways it 
was more conventional than legend would have us believe (Mayhew and Edwards, 
1936). 
Dewey declared his views on liberalism in 1935, in his Page-Barbour lectures. 
In the historical definition, the English "liberalism" of the 17th and 18th centuries 
is equated with individualism and set up in contrast to state and government. In the 
19th century, Dewey stated, this resulted in the antagonism between individual and 
society (Dewey, 1963, p. 5), which led in turn to the socially irresponsible "laissez- 
faire liberalism" of the economy (op. cit., p. 11). Dewey interpreted "liberalism" in 
the context of American atural philosophy, which tries to reconcile freedom with 
community without needing a government, divided powers, or, as in Locke and 
Adam Smith, any political public. It is therefore no accident that individualism 
or economic egoism is replaced by a new, organised form of liberalism which 
anywhere lse would have been given the name of social democracy (op. cit., 
pp. 54 et seq.). Its prime task is education, meaning altering the old mentality 
and radically changing the institutions that attack the status quo of society (op. 
cit., pp. 61 et seq. and p. 65). All this was stated in the context of the New Deal, 
which was the first major state intervention i American history and was very 
closely associated with educational programmes. When Dewey says that liberalism 
is irrelevant without radicalism (op. cit., p. 62), then he is referring to expectations 
which were specifically connected with these programmes.13 
The forecast was not wrong, even though state educational policies as con- 
tinental Europeans understand them did not start o take hold until after the Second 
World War and in response to dramatic demographic changes (Zilversmit, 1993; 
Gibboney, 1994). It was exactly this that brought liberal criticism, initially so weak, 
leaping into action because it feared that he planned economy would be transferred 
into the education system. What is now confusingly called "neo-liberalism" has its 
origins in the criticism of the planned economy and its attendant centralisation 
of the educational system. The critical group was organised in 1947 by Friedrich 
Hayek as the Mont Pelerin Society, 14 and included not only the young Milton 
Friedmann, Karl Popper, Bertrand e Jouvenal, and G.J. Stigler, 15 but also Michael 
Polanyi. Polanyi, who submitted a criticism of "USSR economics" in 1936, and 
had held the chair in physical chemistry at the University of Manchester since 
1933, provided one crucial key word: self-government. The example came once 
again from science. Learning science, it was believed in 1942 (Polanyi, 1998, 
pp. 59-82). 16 cannot be prescribed by any authority, nor can any authority take over 
responsibility for it. It has to be conceived as "a loose system" (op. cit., p. 63), one 
that must constantly be redefining its task and always doing this for itself (op. cit.). 
What applies to the sciences must ultimately also apply to any kind of learning; 
it is not just an "experiment", but requires a social organisation, and must never 
allow itself to become centrally controlled in any way. This applies all the more to 
the economic organisation: small groups with a higher level of autonomy, loosely 
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connected to one another, work more successfully than a large, centrally controlled 
corporations (op. cit., p. 141). 
The basic assumption therefore has to be the vague "superiority of a system 
of spontaneous order" (op. cit., p. 145), the superiority of the learning unit which 
organises its order for itself. This is the only kind of organisation that can handle the 
risks of inconsistency, 17meaning that it can react quickly and appropriately tonew 
situations which in a centrally managed system of learning can only be perceived 
as an analogy with the previous ituation. It is no accident that Leo Trotsky, from 
his place of exile in 1931, called for a "universal spirit", following the example of 
Laplace, to rescue the Soviet economy, which was to be judged not by its disastrous 
results but intensified in its centralism on condition that the right spirit spread out 
in all directions (op. cit., p. 154). Since Friedrich Hayek's Road to Serfdom (1944) 
and Ludwig von Mises Planned Chaos (1947), criticism of central planning and 
the replacement of the market by the plan has been submitted convincingly but 
without initially having any effect on the education system. Economic criticism 
of the school seemed to be superfluous in fight of the philanthropic justification 
of education, while the de facto expansion of education did not need to bother 
itself with Polanyi's forecast of "Self-Government". It would actually have been 
an alternative to planned education i  the way that Dewey and other radicals had 
imagined it in the 1930s; first, however, the philanthropic justification and a vague 
but attractive benefit promise ensured expansion, or at least that which Polanyi n 
1948 had called The Span of Central Direction. 18 
It is a great temptation, as Friedrich Hayek wrote in 1960, to consider that a 
deliberately achieved result is always better than one that has come about acci- 
dentally (Hayek, 1971, p. 467). In the organisation of education this resulted in the 
attempt to eliminate chance, meaning an attempt to bring equality of opportunity 
up to the level at which everyone could make the best possible use of their fight to 
an education and would have access to the very highest qualifications. If selection 
were still to be used, this would require a test machinery which would involve 
"an official categorisation of human beings into a rank order, with the officially 
certified genius at the top level and the officially certified blockhead at the bottom" 
(op. cit., p. 473). Equality, in this sense, makes free access impossible, but where 
free access is possible inequality has to be assumed. The principle of "equality of 
opportunity" thus either leads to a bureaucratic limitation of freedom or refuses to 
accept he assumed effect, because chance cannot actually be eliminated (op. cit., 
p. 471) - otherwise, the planned economy would have had to have been successful. 
In 1960, the media campaign entitled "Sputnik Shock" was just three years 
old. The inferiority of the Western, and particularly the American, educational 
system had never been proved empirically, although it had been communicated 
successfully in rhetoric, and this led to efforts towards a planned change in the 
educational rea which led in turn to expansion and loss of control. It was once 
again economic riticism (Hanusek, 1981, and various others), that pointed out 
the limits of saturation which must have existed if only because the educational 
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system has no notion of marginal benefits and is thus only capable of producing 
more of the same. It is noteworthy that concepts of democratic theory were only 
now being brought into play that went above and beyond the ideas that Dewey had 
been expounding in 1916 - without, incidentally, having any great practical influ- 
ence. It is also noteworthy that Polanyi's ideas of self-govemment were transferred 
into the educational rea but without so far connecting of the one with the other. 
"Self-government" is regarded as a liberal idea, and "democratic education" as a 
community idea, without simply applying the doctrines of communitarianism. Most 
of the concepts based on Dewey's ideas provide for variants of the civil society, 
meaning that hey turn the theoretical decision back to Priestley and the spectrum of 
discussion following Hobbes (Tuck, 1993). Alasdair Maclntyre (1992) has pointed 
out in this connection that "liberal education" can no longer be defined in terms 
of the educational nd social pattern of the Scottish Enlightenment because the 
locally defined educational environment has disappeared. But what then? How is 
the relationship between "democracy" and "education" tobe conceived when the 
civil society is not being created simply by an increase in the proportion of young 
people qualifying for university entrance, the average member of the public does 
not need education, and democracy is open to every kind of education because 
"lack of education" does not violate any civil rights? 
My last point will not answer these difficult questions but it will go into the 
theoretical design of "democracy and education" in the hope that the future prob- 
lems will thus become visible. The existing design, meaning basically Dewey's 
Democracy and Education, is attuned neither to the media society nor to forms of 
particular emancipation, either to various cultures nor to the large and shallow 
areas of discussion, neither to self-confident individuality nor to the status of 
customers who are learning to obtain the education that hey consider they need. 
3. Topics of the Future 
The liberal criticism of the educational system is better than the liberal alternative. 
Friedrich Hayek, in 1960, looking at general schools, insisted that the main point 
was to improve the individual's ability to make use of opportunities, conscious 
"that an improvement would benefit everybody but mainly those who are most 
capable of making use of it, and this will often initially increase inequality" (Hayek, 
1970, p. 474; the reference is to Young, 1958). There is no systemic alternative 
apart from Milton Friedmann's 1955 idea of education vouchers, and criticism has 
tended to be polemic, meaning that it has concentrated more on accusations than 
on a close consideration f the education system. The central theme was the contra- 
diction between freedom and the state, and the contradiction between democracy 
and education took second place. However, this relationship must be seen against 
the background of a systemic history which cannot be simply dismissed and was 
not simply a great failure. Since the early 19th century, public education has been 
entrusted to a specialised institution which cannot be changed overnight, which 
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learns from its own assumptions, and which is highly inventive in its ability to 
circumvent ignorant attempts at reform. Education is still essentially a personal 
resource, one that is dependent on pleasing or displeasing, and is therefore imper- 
vious to pure output control. The power of the teachers, to put it unkindly, arises 
from the dependency into which they bring education expectations without having 
Trotsky's "great spirit" available to them. As Dewey perceived (1985a, pp. 113 et 
seq.), it is not possible to deduce the course of the process from its goals. 
Uncertainty remains, and it is presumably the very openness of the situation that 
stimulates demand, not only because opportunities can be seen but also because 
they can be related in real terms to the user. On the other hand, democratic 
education systems increase the uncertainty in a number of respects: 
- they mobilise educational expectations 
- by releasing aspirations they increase the risks 
- by making education successful they increase dependency 
- by increasing demands they have to accept vague and disconcerting uses and 
- they are not capable of resolving their manifest paradoxes. 
Hayek's criticism of the concept of "equality of opportunity" only serves to 
formulate one dilemma which ideology disguises without ending its existence. The 
opening of higher education to many or indeed most social levels is accompanied 
by increased competition, which has to be understood in philanthropic terms. 
However, selection does not disappear but is only shifted to a different position, 
whilst, as studies into the willingness of parents to invest have shown (Helberger 
and Palamidis, 1992), the opportunities are exploited, apparently taking competi- 
tion into account, which can only be discounted in the idyllic world of educational 
experts. There is therefore no alternative to opening up, and it is no accident hat 
Hayek does not mention one. 
The real question is a different one, and it takes us back to Dewey: does the 
democratic society demand emocratic educational institutions constructed to the 
same pattern as political democracy? Or is " general education" in a democracy 
meant to mean schooling in preparation for life of a form that demands neither 
participation or public control? Maynard Hutchins, who set off a great debate in 
1936,19 looked at the curriculum of the University of Chicago and argued in favour 
of the second version, in the same way as Maritain (1943, p. 115), who saw a 
link between education and "natural faith of reason in truth". This assumes that 
there will be a humanistic urriculum which is not negotiable. The inner structure 
of the curriculum, 2~ at least in higher education, is not available for amendment 
(op. cit., pp. 55 et seq.). Anyone who reveals it dissolves the relationship between 
the subjects, must accept every possible demand, and thus cannot give any further 
guarantee for the standard. Education would have no cohesion, and would dissolve 
into separate, individual interests, everyone would pick out the education he or she 
needed but would not be educated - in the sense of a curriculum - and would never 
have been subjected to the standards that a real education demands. 
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The deliberative idea of democratic education along the fines suggested by 
Amy Gutmann (1987/1999) has tended if anything to weaken this emphasis on the 
practicality and structure of education. On the other hand, the communitaristic criti- 
cism of a procedural republic (Sandel, 1996), which is more or less equivalent to 
that which Helmut Schelsky indicated against the discussion theory as permanent 
reflection, is not even approximately close to a proper education. It appears to be 
superfluous, for apparently good reasons, as the American curriculum discussion in 
the 1990s showed (Carnochan, 1993; Graft, 1992; and various others): the school- 
education canon, if it represents anything, only represents he white Anglo-Saxon 
majority in the form of the middle and upper classes. The education they are 
demanding is on offer, whilst other cultures, minorities, groupings remote from 
education, and also the opposition to education are given no consideration. They 
are not excluded structurally, but their interests are also not served. This can be said 
again in general terms: in the educational system there is no customer principle; 
children are not given the education they want, but have to take what is offered 
by schools in public, meaning usually state, control. Anyone, therefore, who goes 
through the nine or ten years of compulsory general education and expects to be 
taught he basics of esoterics is bound to be disappointed, just as anyone will be - 
a far less obvious point - who is expecting any elementary knowledge of medicine, 
Chinese literature, medieval music or modem Islamic writings. They will be more 
likely to learn at school about the art and craft of producing web-sites than to 
come into serious contact with social geography; on the other hand, however, in 
physical training lessons they are sure to be confronted with medicine-balls and 
climbing-ropes. 
This curriculum has never been democratically decided in the sense of having 
been discussed and put to the vote. In multi-cultural, open, rapidly disintegrating 
societies, however, these historical educational convictions are disappearing, 
meaning the opinions held constantly between the generations about what belongs 
in a curriculum and what does not. The latest canon discussions will not prevent 
this erosion, which is closely related to participation and a strengthening of public 
control. Public conviction is the only effective form that needs transparency and 
continuity at the same time. Radical system changes, as developments in Great 
Britain since 1987 have shown, 21 are risky, or at least riskier than a democratic 
opening-up of schools to make the education they offer transparent and acces- 
sible to public discussion. Hybrids have arisen in Great Britain, half-private and 
half-state, with more autonomy but at the same time more bureaucracy. Schools 
the way I imagine them will no longer be institutions protected by the state but 
public learning-places, and they will have to prove that they really do fulfil their 
basic legitimacy: the fairest possible distribution of education as a public good 
(Winch, 1996). Perhaps it is no accident that in Switzerland this discussion isbeing 
conducted particularly in Zurich, where there is an outstandingly liberal and public 
school structure which has existed since the 1830s. 
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The justification of public and, with an increasing minimum, equally distributed 
education can be based on contractual theory (Gauthier, 1990), if and to the extent 
that a contract can be assumed to exist between the generations. The contract exists 
de facto since the early 19th century, and provides for each subsequent generation 
to take over the level of education achieved so far and not to fall below it; if 
possible, its own learning processes hould raise it further. The contract allows 
every possible differentiation upwards but what it immediately ensures is the rising 
minimum, meaning the successful access to a historically constantly rising level 
of school knowledge for the largest number of schoolchildren and with rising 
standards. How this generations-contract "education" operates can be seen abso- 
lutely authentically in that the attained level, for instance of literacy, determines 
not only public expectations but also the criticism of a school. In this sense it is 
absolutely right to talk about feedback-orientation; if the schools do not learn from 
their customers they will not be able to meet he requirements of the generation- 
contract. Their output, in fact, is not identical with the marks they give their pupils. 
This explains why public schools will increasingly have to put up with democratic 
questions about heir efficiency. 
This appears to be taking us away from the great heories and to immerse the 
subject in the depths of school politics. However, grand theory was never partic- 
ularly successful either, between the extremes of Fichte and Dewey, in providing 
a basis for the pragmatic aspect of the problem. We can hardly ever arrive at very 
good decisions on the structural dilemmas of the system, but we are very well 
accustomed to avoid them. One difficult American example is whether, and if so 
how, to reject the demands of creationists, who want to influence the teaching 
of biology, when creationists are citizens, and compulsory schooling applies to 
all other citizens, but the educational interests of all citizens are not being taken 
into account in the school curriculum. References to the binding rationality of 
the Enlightenment is seen by citizens' interest-groups a paternalistic. Esoterics, 
magic, and probably also Bible lessons can also present themselves as demanding 
disciplines, whilst the school would dissolve into popularity if it were to meet 
all the demands that are in any way connected with "education". The reduction 
of the grand theory is also connected with the fact, before and after Humboldt, 
"education" was regarded as the amalgamation f the human and the world which 
can only generate randomness if it is not bound by canon, because very demand 
has to be accommodated without creating aparadox. 
The school as a specialised institution thus fulfils its democratic task in securing 
an educational programme for future citizens. This programme must be subject o 
public control, but there is no automatic argument in favour of subjecting schools 
to excessive supervisory stress unless it makes sense. They really do operate best 
in the form of self-government, although this does admittedly assume that they can 
avoid the trap of self-aggrandisement. Democratic education must implement the 
principles of democracy but at the same time meet he requirements of education. 
A reduction of education basically to social experience or experimental learning is 
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not tenable. The decisive aspect of education is subject-related learning, meaning 
the point at which the knowledge and ability of third parties is translated into one's 
own experience, so that the standards become individualised. This also serves 
democracy,  because, according to Condorcet, this requires critical citizens who 
can show solidarity not with the ruling classes but with democracy, meaning the 
disputable xchange of arguments in the sphere of the political public which have 
to be binding on any government if it is to be legitimate. The virtue required here 
is called moral  courage, and its characteristic s that it requires education. 
Back to theory for a summing-up: schools are not the "embryonic society"; 
their smal l  space does not correspond to the large one; otherwise "education" 
would have to be conceived as spatial transport, although this would require a 
large number of well intended concepts. With Dewey, the theory is vague at a 
central point, and unexpectedly unclear. The problem is determining the relation- 
ship, meaning the question as to how education is to relate to democracy if there 
is no longer an automatic and simple relationship such as Emerson conceived (and 
presumably never has been). Dewey assumes one and only one relationship, that of 
the school to society in the sense of the metaphor of the small and the large. The 
theoretical challenge of the future consists of assuming multi-linear elationships 
between education and democracy, linked together in different lengths, paradoxical 
and just as much open as concealed, all of which cannot be easily defined. No such 
theory is available, and I cannot provide one either, but it is high time that one 
should be developed. This is the only way in which the educational theory of the 
"well intended concepts" can be put into perspective. 
Notes 
I Max Scheler, "The genius of the war and the German war" appeared (in German) in 1915, the same 
year in which Paul Natorp's "The day of the Germans" appeared (also in German) as a collection of 
1914 texts. Dewey's ource is Friedrich von Bernhardi (1914). 
2 "Kant was enough of a child of the eighteenth century to be cosmopolitan, ot nationalistic, inhis 
feeling. Since humanity as a whole, in its universality, alone truly corresponds to the universality of 
reason, he upheld the ideal of an ultimate republican federation of states" (Dewey, 1985, p. 171). 
3 For the latest state of research, see: Kerbs and Reulecke (1998), and also Kamp (1995). 
4 The aim of civil responsibility (Fichte, WW VII, pp. 416 et seq.) requires tate totalitarianism 
and thus implies the removal of responsibility from the parents (op. cit., pp. 434 et seq.). This can 
be compared with "compulsory war service" (op. cit., p. 436). "Only a total change-over, only the 
beginning of a totally new spirit, can help us" (op. cit., p. 476, emphasis added by the present author). 
5 De gli eroicifurori (1585). 
6 An Essay on a Course of Liberal Education for Civil andActive Life (1764) (Priestley, 1793, Vol. 
I, pp. 2-38). 
7 "The infant has the advantage of the multitude of instinctive tentative reactions and of the exper- 
iences that accompany them, even though he is at temporary disadvantage b cause they cross one 
another. In learning an action, instead of having it given ready-made, one of necessity learns to vary 
its factors, to make varied combinations ofthem, according to change of circumstances. A possibility 
of continuing progress is opened up by the fact that in learning one act, methods are developed good 
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for use in other situations. Still more important is the fact that the human being acquires a habit of 
learning. He learns to learn" (Dewey, 1985a, p. 50). 
8 The criteria are defined differently: the democratic ideal envisages the building up of mutual 
interests and the flee exchange of views in a process of constant adjustment tonew situations (Dewey, 
1985a, p. 92). Democratic education as "a social process" relates to the exchange of views and 
participation i decisions under conditions of equality (op. cit., p. 105). 
9 "Such a society must have a type of education which gives individuals a personal interest in social 
relationships and control, and the habits of mind which secure and social changes without introducing 
disorder" (Dewey, 1985a, p. 105). 
l0 The contrary view comes from Ulich (1940). 
11 "We never come to be citizens of the world, but are still villagers, who think that everything in 
their petty town is a little superior to the same thing anywhere lse" (Emerson, Works, 1912, pp. 120- 
121). 
12 School and Society (1899). 
13 The justification relates to the effect of public education: "Without a back- ground of informed 
political intelligence, direct action on behalf of professed liberal ends may end in the development 
of political irresponsibility" (Dewey, 1963, p. 16). 
14 Friedrich Hayek, who had taken up a professorship n Vienna in 1929, held four lectures at 
the invitation of Lord Robbins in the winter of 1931 at the London School of Economics, and was 
promoted to the position of Faculty Professor not long after that. Louis Rougier, influenced by Walter 
Lippman's book An Inquiry into the Principles of a Good Society, organised a meeting in Paris in 
1938 of liberal philosophers and economists which was attended, among others, by Ludwig yon 
Mises, Hayek himself, and Michael Polanyi. Hayek's Society was founded in 1947 to continue this 
group's work. 
15 Stigler, as well as Friedman, influenced the education economy or in other words the transfer of 
market heory to the educational sector. 
16 Self-Government of Science, address to the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society 
(February 1942). 
17 Perils oflnconsistency (Polanyi, 1998, pp. 115-113). 
18 The Span of Central Direction, The Manchester School (1948). 
19 Van Doren (1943) and various others. 
20 Designed to follow the example of the artes liberales, meaning the trivium consisting of 
Eloquence, Literature, and Poetry, plus Music and the Plastic Arts, and the quadrivium consisting 
of Mathematics, Physics and Natural Science, and Philosophy, plus Ethics and Social Philosophy. 
Prior to all this the student first has to learn Grammar, Logic, Languages, History, and Geography 
(Maritain, 1943, pp. 56-57). 
21 The 1987 Education Act for the first time allowed market-like conditions. As a result, a national 
curriculum was introduced for the first time in Great Britain which increased bureaucratic costs and 
intensified the control exerted by the Schools Inspectorate. The earlier form of local autonomy was 
abolished, for political reasons, and replaced by a formal degree of autonomy (as with the budgets) 
which further increased costs. 
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